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Abstract
I show the equivalence between a model of financial contagion and the threshold
model of global cascades proposed by Watts (2002). The model financial network
comprises banks that hold risky external assets as well as interbank assets. It is shown
that a simple threshold model can replicate the size and the frequency of financial
contagion without using information about individual balance sheets.
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1 Introduction
Bank default is contagious. The failure of a single bank can spread through financial
networks, generating default cascades. Over the past few years, many researchers in various
fields of natural and social sciences, such as physicists, ecologists and economists, have
been addressing the question of how to prevent financial contagion (e.g., Nier et al., 2007,
Soramaki et al., 2007, Gai and Kapadia, 2010, Gai et al., 2011, Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2012,
Kobayashi, 2013, Kobayashi and Hasui, 2014).
However, there is no wide agreement among researchers about how to construct a
model of financial contagion. Different research groups use different models, which makes
it difficult to establish a consensus about policy implications.1
In this letter, I show the equivalence between a model of financial contagion and the
widely-used threshold model of global cascades proposed by Watts (2002).2 Basically, fi-
nancial network models require researchers to construct bank balance sheets. The influence
of a bank failure is then examined by sequentially undermining the interbank assets of the
lenders. Second-round defaults occur if the number of defaulted borrowers among total
borrowers exceeds a certain threshold.
This mechanism is closely related to that of the Watts model of cascades. I show that
there is no need to construct bank balance sheets as long as the “shadow” threshold of
default is appropriately defined in accordance with the volatility of assets.
2 The models
2.1 A model of financial contagion
The model of financial contagion used in this paper is an extended version of Gai and
Kapadia (2010). The essential difference is that I take into account stochastic fluctuations
in the value of external assets.
A typical bank’s balance sheet is illustrated in Figure 1. There are N banks in the
1See Lorenz et al. (2009) and Upper (2011) for a survey of the literature.
2See, for example, Dodds and Watts (2004), Gleeson and Cahalane (2007), Watts and Dodds (2007) and
Gleeson (2013).
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Fig. 1. A typical bank’s balance sheet.
financial market. Bank i holds risky external assets, ai, interbank assets, li, and riskless
assets, bi. On the liability side, there are deposits, di, interbank liabilities, p¯i, and net
worth, wi. The balance-sheet condition implies that ai + li + bi = di + p¯i +wi.
Banks are connected to each other by lending and borrowing. The existence of a
lending-borrowing relationship is expressed as a link or an edge. In network theory, the
number of outgoing links is called out-degree, while the number of incoming links is called
in-degree. The direction of links represents the flow of funds at the time of initial lending.
The amount of bank i’s borrowings from bank j is expressed as piij p¯i, where piij denotes
the relative weight of bank i’s borrowings from j, and thereby
∑
j 6=i piij = 1, i = 1, . . . , N .
The amount of bank i’s total interbank assets is given by li =
∑N
j 6=i pijip¯j .
Bank i will default if
p¯i >
∑
j 6=i
pijipj + a˜i + bi − di, (1)
where a˜i and pj stand for the ex-post values of external assets and interbank liabilities,
respectively. It should be pointed out that deposits, di, are reserved because they are senior
to interbank assets.
Provided that there is no loss in interbank assets, a bank will default with probability δ
due to a loss of external assets. δ indicates the probability of fundamental defaults, which
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is assumed to be common across banks.
If bank j fails, then bank j’s creditors lose all of the credits they extended to bank j.
Some of these creditors may fail due to the loss of their interbank assets. Accordingly, the
creditors of the creditors of bank j may fail as well, because they in turn lose the credits
they extended to the failed banks.
Given the size of each interbank asset, the total sizes of interbank assets and liabilities
are determined by the structure of the interbank network. To ensure that the probability
of fundamental defaults is the same across banks, the relative size of external assets to net
worth is fixed. If bank i has so many incoming links that its liability side is bigger than its
tentative total assets, li + ai + b¯i, where b¯i denotes the tentatively assigned riskless assets,
then riskless assets are added to adjust the asset side. Otherwise, deposits are imposed to
adjust the liability side.3 After such adjustments, the capital ratio, wi/(li + ai + bi), may
differ across banks while the tentative capital ratio, wi/(li + ai + b¯i) ≡ γ, is common. The
tentative ratio of total interbank assets to total assets, li/(li + ai + b¯i) ≡ θ
i
l , is allowed to
vary across banks.
2.2 The Watts model of global cascades
Let us summarize the Watts’ (2002) threshold model of cascades. In this model, each
node in the network takes one of two states: “flipped” or “not flipped”. The network is
undirected.
Let ki and mi denote node i’s degree and the number of its flipped neighbors, respec-
tively. The algorithm of cascading behavior in the Watts model is that


node i flips if mi > φiki,
node i does not flip otherwise,
where φi ∈ [0, 1] is the threshold of flipping for node i. This means that the threshold
number of flipped neighbors above which node i will flip is ⌊φiki⌋, where ⌊x⌋ denotes the
floor function that returns the maximum integer smaller than x.
3Notice that this adjustment does not affect the probability of fundamental default.
3
3 Equivalence between a financial network model and a thresh-
old model
Here, I show the equivalence between the financial network model and a modified version
of the threshold model. Recall that the ex-post value of external assets, a˜i, is determined
stochastically. Let ∆ai ≡ a˜i − ai be the return of external assets.
Let us suppose that the amount of individual interbank lending is common. Then, if
∆ai = 0, bank i will fail if the fraction of its defaulted borrowers exceeds ⌊wi/li⌋. Note
that there is no possibility of contagious default if wi > li, as long as there is no loss in
external assets.
If ∆ai 6= 0, on the other hand, the threshold for the fraction of defaulted borrowers
depends on the realization of asset returns. If a bank earns positive (negative) returns from
its external assets, it becomes more resilient against (susceptible to) contagious default.
Let φ˜i be the “shadow” threshold of default for bank i. It follows that
φ˜i =
wi +∆ai
li
=
γ
θil
+
∆ai
li
, for i ∈ {i | li > 0}. (2)
Here, θil is treated as a parameter. Thus, if asset returns, ∆ai, follow a distribution of
mean zero and variance σ2i , then the shadow threshold φ˜i follows a distribution of mean
γ
θi
l
and variance
(
σi
li
)2
. More generally, the p.d.f. of φ˜i, defined as fi(·), is given by
fi(x) = li · gi(x · li − γli/θ
i
l), i ∈ {i | li > 0}. (3)
where gi(·) is the p.d.f. of ∆ai.
Let us assume that asset returns follow a normal distribution with mean zero. Let
z˜ ≡ F−1(δ), where F−1 is the inverse c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The
standard deviation of asset returns, σi, such that the probability of fundamental default
becomes δ is given as
σi =
−wi
z˜
, ∀ i,
=
−γli
θil z˜
, for i ∈ {i | li > 0}. (4)
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Fig. 2. Comparison between balance sheet-based models (BS models) and the corresponding thresh-
old models. Note: “Crisis” is defined as a situation in which at least 5% of banks go bankrupt. BS
model A: the baseline model. BS model B: the ratio of interbank assets to total assets is distributed
on [.2, .4]. BS model C: the size of individual interbank assets is distributed on [.2, 1.8].
It follows from Eqs. (2) and (4) that the shadow threshold φ˜i follows a normal distribution
with mean γ/θil and standard deviation −γ/(θ
i
l z˜).
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In this way, the balance sheet-based model of financial contagion shown above can
be expressed as a simple threshold model. Intuitively, the shadow threshold will become
smaller as the returns of external assets take a lower value, meaning that the bank becomes
more susceptible to default contagion. Those banks that have a negative value of φ˜i will
fail at the beginning, which corresponds to the case of fundamental defaults in the model
of financial contagion.5
4Recall that z˜ takes a negative value.
5Note that Prob(φ˜i < 0) = Prob(
γ
θi
l
−
γy
θi
l
z˜
< 0) = F (y < z˜) = δ, where y is a random variable from the
standard normal distribution.
5
I consider three variants of the model: Cases A, B and C. In Case A, or the baseline
model, the size of individual interbank assets is fixed at unity, and θil = θl = .3 for
i ∈ {i | li > 0}. In Case B, θ
i
l is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [.2, .4]. In Case 3,
the size of individual interbank asset is uniformly distributed on [.2, 1.8].
In Figure 2, a balance sheet-based contagion model, called “BS model”, is compared
with the corresponding threshold model. With respect to BS model C, the corresponding
threshold model is modified as follows:


node i flips if µi > φi,
node i does not flip otherwise,
where µi ∈ [0, 1] is the sum of the flipped neighbors’ weights. It should be pointed out that
µi is not necessarily equal to mi/ki unless identical weights are given to all the neighbors.
Given the average degree, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (directed) random networks are created 20 times,
and asset returns and shadow thresholds are independently generated 1000 times for each
network structure. Other parameters are as follows: N = 1000, γ = .1 and δ = .01.
Figure 2 reveals that in all cases, an appropriately defined threshold model can replicate
the size and frequency of financial contagion created by the BS model.
4 Conclusion and discussion
The methods shown in this letter will enable us to analyze financial contagion without
detailed information about every single balance sheet. What is needed is the distribution
of balance-sheet components among banks. Fluctuations in asst returns and cross-sectional
differences in various balance-sheet parameters can be incorporated into the threshold
model.
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